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Our sister is one of the so-called ‘living
dead’ referred to in your news report
(‘Mind of the living dead’, March 2010).
Serious brain injuries sustained over a
year ago left her first in a coma and now
in a minimally conscious state (MCS)
from which she is extremely unlikely 
to recover. We read your report with
dismay, since we do not share your
excitement about the ‘amazing’ findings
emerging from brain-imaging research
and we feel that psychologists should be
more critically engaged with the wider
issues such research raises.
Your report seemed to reflect and
reiterate, rather than challenge, some of
the uncritical reporting so often evident
in mass media coverage of this topic
(Racine et al., 2006). Although the New
Scientist and Independent– in the two
articles you cite – were better than
most, their headlines are hardly, as you
claim, ‘justified’, but instead typify the
overblown claims that often accompany
reporting about brain imaging. We
challenge the notion that imaging 
allows scientists to ‘read minds’ (the
Independent’s headline) or that it
provides ‘A voice for the voiceless’ 
(New Scientist).
Uncritical summaries of this field 
fail to address the limitations of brain-
imaging technology or to challenge the
basic assumption that increased blood
flow to the brain is an accurate surrogate
for consciousness (see Poldrack, 2006).
There is also often no acknowledgement
that for severely brain-damaged MCS
patients ‘consciousness’ does not mean an
intact cognition, the capacity to weigh up
different clinical options, or to ‘converse’
with caregivers about treatments and to
make decisions. 
The recent jubilance about fMRI
scanning feeds into a culture of
misunderstanding
encouraged by false
media reports about
patients diagnosed as
vegetative being able to
type complex sentences
(as in the recent case of
the much-publicised
Belgian ‘coma writer’,
Rom Houben) or grossly
inaccurate films featuring
patients waking up from
even prolonged comas
with fully intact
cognition. In fact, the
prognosis after prolonged
coma, vegetative and
MCS states is bleak; for
example, ‘there are no
reports of patients in a
vegetative state identified
as “conscious” by
functional neuroimaging
making a recovery to
functional independence’
(Wilkinson et al., 2009,
p.509).
These pages are central to The
Psychologist’s role as a forum
for discussion and debate, and
we welcome your contributions.
Send e-mails marked 
‘Letter for publication’ to
psychologist@bps.org.uk; or
write to the Leicester office. 
Letters over 500 words are less likely to
be published. The editor reserves the
right to edit or publish extracts from
letters. Letters to the editor are not
normally acknowledged, and space does
not permit the publication of every letter
received. 
However, see www.thepsychologist.org.uk
to contribute to our discussion forum
(members only).
‘Giving voice to the voiceless’ –
high-tech speculation, or basic respect?
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A series of writings in The Psychologist has
led me eventually to write this letter that 
I have been reminding myself to write for
about 15 years now. Firstly, it was a recent
edition about mothers with a colour
photograph of a black woman but making
no specific mention of black
mothers/infants; then it was Yvonne
Walsh’s letter ‘Applied discrimination?’
(May 2010) commenting on the omission
of mentions of counselling psychology in
a recent special edition of The Psychologist
on social inclusion; and finally Christian
Jarrett’s article ‘Feeling like a fraud’ (May
2010) about females ‘masquerading’ as
males and having a corresponding fear 
of ‘being found out’ (as not being viable
practitioners and scientists). As part of
this article, there was a photo of a female
named Dr James Barry with her (black
male) servant and her dog Psyche. 
My concern has for many years now
been the invisibility of the psychology of
black women in Britain and elsewhere in
the world in The Psychologist. Do we have
a psychology that is distinct and relevant
to be commented on in UK psychology
Black women in the UK – the last of the impostors?
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See p.478 for Martin Monti and Adrian Owen’s article on
consciousness and the vegetative state
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We believe that ‘giving a voice’ to
such patients (to use neurologist Steven
Laureys’ phrase in the New Scientist
report) should not simply be pursued by
expensive fMRI scanning – with
whatever remote ‘hope’ that offers.
Instead (or as well) it requires more
basic listening skills – and psychologists
already have a key, albeit often neglected,
role to play here. Our sister’s ‘voice’ was,
for many months, expressed mainly
through grimaces of pain, moaning or
frantic kicking, and her opinions before
brain injury were clearly articulated in
her poetry, letters and conversations
with family and friends. Ensuring that
her voice is heard means paying
attention to these more transparent
indications of what she might now 
want – we do not need brain imaging 
to understand this. Unfortunately we
have found that public enthusiasm for
research that ‘listens’ (via fMRI) to
patients answering questions about their
father’s name by imagining a tennis game
[see p.478] is matched by professionals’
total lack of interest in patients’ clearly
expressed values and beliefs. For the
first 11 months our sister’s clinical team
never asked about what our sister might
want in this situation, nor did they take
seriously the efforts of family and friends
to communicate this. 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 is
supposed to put the person who lacks
capacity at the centre of any decision
making about them. It builds on a strong
disability-rights perspective and on the
long experience of organisations of, and
for, people with mental incapacities of 
all types. The Act spells out the fact that
‘best interest’ decisions about medical
treatment, for example, are not purely
clinical: they are supposed to take into
account the person’s past and present
wishes and feelings. There is a crucial
place for psychologists here.
Psychologists can support families and
friends to ‘give a voice’ to incapacitated
patients by ensuring that we distinguish
between what we might want for
ourselves, or for the patient, and what
the patient might want for herself.
Psychologists can support families and
friends to articulate the patient’s views
and help decision makers to take these
views into account in decisions about 
the patient’s best interest.
The Mental Capacity Act, and the
values that underpin it, are not as ‘sexy’
as the supposedly dramatic findings
revealed by fMRI. However, ensuring
that all psychologists understand the Act
and help to implement it, is a key place
to start if a patient’s voice is really to be
‘heard’. Only then can we hope to
reinstate ‘A voice for the voiceless’.
Professor Celia Kitzinger
University of York
Professor Jenny Kitzinger
Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and
Cultural Studies, Cardiff University
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Wot, no politics?
I was surprised to see that the May
edition of The Psychologist was not a little
more politically engaged, considering that
there was an election on and the
inevitable cuts that will affect mental
health because of the deficit. I wonder
why psychology as a profession is so
unwilling to engage in
political debate when 
it can be claimed that
‘politics in psychology 
is inescapable’ (Fox &
Prilleltensky, 1996). By
including Jo Silvester’s
article the magazine
seemed to try to step
outside of politics and
turn a ‘scientific’ eye on
the individual politician
instead of confronting the
reality that mental health has always 
been the soft option when it comes to
slashing funding in the public service. 
If The Psychologist really aims to
promote the advancement and diffusion
of a knowledge of psychology, does that
not include the welfare of the individuals
we are supposed to be working with as
clinical, counselling, educational, forensic
and occupational psychologists, all of
whom will be affected by public service
cuts? Should the welfare of these
individuals, and our duty of care, not
come first instead of openly admitting 
in a respectable magazine that all
psychology has to show when it comes 
to politics is how to McDonaldize a
selection process?
Psychology does not exist outside 
the social and cultural context of which 
it operates, and can therefore never be
apolitical. When asked why critical
psychology always tries to make
everything into a political issue, Ian
Parker (2007) replied: ‘The problem is
not that we make psychology political,
but that it already is political, and this is
something mainstream psychology does
not like to acknowledge’ (p.5). Perhaps
there is a need to acknowledge this in an
open forum such as The Psychologist and
engage with what this entails. 
Patrick Larsson
London N7
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journals in general and in The Psychologist
in particular? Or are we impostors too (or
am I), for trying to make a special case for
a feature on psychological research
involving black females in the UK, when
in fact there are no specific psychological
issues for black females in the UK, being
no different from white or other ethnic
groups of women, indeed no different
from any other groups at all? 
The editor of The Psychologist assures
me that a special issue on psychology and
black and minority ethnic groups is in the
planning stages. However, I would also
echo the sentiments of Yvonne Walsh that
at the very least the editors should be
asking for some reference to wider groups
even if it is to direct readers to more
‘specialist’ reading that cannot be taken
fully on board in the limited writing space
that is available to contributors. Dr James
Barry – said to have practised in the 1800s
– would have had to wait until only just
over 30 years ago to be considered equal
to her male counterparts. Like many others
I am very proud to be a British-trained
applied psychologist, but I remain
concerned that for some areas of research,
UK psychology does appear to be rather
slow in advancing to the 21st century. 
Jeune Guishard-Pine
Harrow
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It is with great sadness I mark the death of my
friend, colleague and collaborator Liz Campbell,
who died on Good Friday, 2 April 2010, from
breast cancer.
Liz was a chartered clinical and forensic
psychologist and until recently head of the
Division of Psychological Medicine at the
University of Glasgow. In 2008 she became
President of the British Psychological Society, 
a role she was proud to undertake and to which
she brought her own brand of dash and flair.
She had held numerous other key roles within
the BPS, and had served as a Trustee for many
years; at the time of her death she was Vice
President. Most recently
she was elected to the role
of Secretary General of the
European Federation of
Psychology Associations.
She very much regretted
that her illness prevented
her from taking up this
role. 
Her tenure as BPS
President was at a
particularly difficult 
time of transition to the
statutory regulation of
psychologists. Her deft
negotiation and attention
to detail helped steer the
Society to a solution that
aimed to protect the
public and maintained the
integrity of the profession.
She wrote: ‘Psychology
and psychologists have a
great capacity for contributing to the public
good. My vision is to safeguard standards and
to maintain the principles and values of the
Society.’ She achieved just that.
Liz graduated from Edinburgh University
with first class honours and subsequently
gained an MPhil in clinical psychology. In 1985
she was awarded a DPhil from Green College,
Oxford, after completing her thesis on
depression in women.
Her first lecturing job was at Surrey where
she pioneered three-year practitioner doctorates
in counselling and in clinical psychology. She
wanted both clinical and counselling
psychology put on a professional footing, but,
as she told her mother, she had to hope that the
validation panel did not notice she was only a
junior lecturer. She returned to her native city
to take up a senior lecturer post in the Section
of Psychological Medicine of the University of
Glasgow, became Programme Director for the
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology and eventually
became Head of Section in 2005.
Students and staff in both Surrey and
Glasgow benefited immeasurably from her 
clear and precise teaching, and forceful reality
checking on research ideas. She contributed
significantly to understanding stress in the
police through her research endeavours and her
clinical interventions, creating with her Surrey
colleagues one of the earliest services for
officers and police staff. She recently co-edited 
a Handbook of Forensic Psychology, a work
drawing on her considerable scholarship and 
a project she wanted to be a resource for
students, academics and practitioners. Sadly, 
she did not see the finished book, which was
published a couple of
weeks after her death.
She was proud to be
a Scot but was in no way
parochial, always looking
out and beyond. She was
especially pleased with
the collaboration she
achieved through her
European connections 
in developing training
standards and protocols
for psychological
interventions following
terrorist attacks. In
December 2008 she
attended the Indian
National Academy of
Psychology conference,
where she signed a
memorandum of
understanding between the
our two associations. She was
particularly keen to expose psychology to
insights from other traditions and philosophies.
Liz was a considerate clinician, an effective
administrator, a leader with political acumen
and huge emotional intelligence, tempering the
making of difficult decisions with compassion.
She was also intensely human, felt passionate
about injustice, inspired loyal and loving
friendships; although she could be impatient
when folk just could not keep up. The extent of
her reach and the affection and regard in which
she was held in the UK and internationally is
amply illustrated by the number of postings on
the Society’s discussion forum at
www.bps.org.uk/lizcampbell.
Our thoughts and prayers are with Liz’s 
son and mother, and also with her brothers and
their families, who along with her professional
colleagues and friends will miss her warmth,
sound advice and infectious enthusiasm very
much. 
Jennifer Brown
University of Surrey
COMMUNITY
NOTICEBOARD
I The Counselling Psychologists
Working in Forensic Settings
group (CoPiFS) provides a regular
forum for members to exchange
views and innovative ideas on
clinical and professional practice,
discuss institutional problems,
and promote and maintain ethical
best practice among therapy
services in forensic settings. 
CoPiFS meets bi-monthly 
at the Ministry of Justice
headquarters in London, and
membership is free and open to 
all HPC-registered and BPS-
chartered counselling
psychologists, as well as any
trainee counselling psychologists,
working in establishments or
institutions with a forensic focus.
More members are always
welcome, so if you are interested
in attending a future meeting or
finding out more about CoPiFS,
please contact Louise Tite
(L.Tite@hmps.gov.gsi.uk, 07876
341267) for details.
Dr Ron Harper
HMP Whatton
I Dr Seán Haldane, a consultant
neuropsychologist working for the
NHS in memory clinics in London,
has been nominated for the
Oxford Professorship of Poetry.
Seán’s collected poems, Always
Two, were published by Greenwich
Exchange in 2009. Psychologists
who are Oxford graduates will
have a vote in the election and
may want to know that he intends
to lecture, among other things, on
the neuropsychology of poetry and
offer a bridge between psychology
and poetry. 
You can learn more about
Seán on his website
www.seanhakdane.com. Voters
must register to vote between
before 4 June 2010, and will be
able to vote between 26 May and
16 June 2010. 
Robert McHenry
Oriel College
Oxford
obituary
Elizabeth Campbell (1954–2010)
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Developing conceptual clarity
At the end of his article in the May issue
of The Psychologist, Richard McNally 
asks, almost as an afterthought, whether
Wittgenstein can help illuminate the
concept of trauma. So fundamental is 
the question of conceptual clarity to
psychology that, as someone who was
fortunate enough to have read Moral
Sciences at Cambridge while Wittgenstein
was still alive, I must ask you to allow me
to expand a little on Professor McNally’s
tempting hint.
Put simply, what Wittgenstein was
trying to make clear was an identifiable
difference between two kinds of concept.
One kind (Type 1) is an intellectual
construction. An example is the concept
of electricity, which has no meaning
beyond all the observable phenomena 
we call electrical. The labels of physical
objects or categories of objects all belong
to this type. The concepts may be abstract
but they always refer to something
physical, real or imaginary.
Concepts of this first kind are all
potentially definable with precision, and
therefore quantifiable. A finite list of the
criteria for assigning a given phenomenon
to a particular concept can be established;
borderline questions can be resolved.
Circularity is avoidable as definitions can
be made other than in terms of the
concept itself.
The second kind of concept (Type 2)
is experiential in nature, not intellectual.
The concepts record a history of felt
experiences, not external observations. 
No real conceptualising is involved. The
abstractions are labels for universally
perceptible qualities, like betrayal or
compassion. There are societies where
there’s no concept of electricity, but
wherever there are humans, there’ll be
betrayal and, hopefully, compassion too.
People may think they know what
betrayal or compassion mean and use the
labels as if they were Type 1 concepts,
definable in terms of something
observable. But this kind of understanding
is not the understanding of someone who
has not only experienced the feeling of,
for example, being betrayed, but also of
betraying others. These experiences may
be accompanied by more or less intense
emotions, but the feeling of grasping 
what something like betrayal means is 
a separate experience – the experience 
of realisation, a eureka or conversion
experience. The context for the original
experience is unpredictable enough, but
it’s quite impossible to say what might be
a trigger for the sense of grasping what it
means.
Although the meaning is
instantaneously graspable, Type 2
concepts are impossible to define or to
describe in anything like a complete way.
There are always additional aspects to be
revealed. Expressions of these concepts
are of mental phenomena with no finite
boundaries, and are limitless and
countless.
Whereas observations of, and ideas
about, physical events can be organised 
by means of mental activities like
conceptualisation, there is no analogous
way of organising knowledge of mental
events by using physical activities. The
only way of doing this is by using clever
metaphors. This is the reason experts in
the use of metaphor – poets, novelists and
dramatists – can often help us not only
feel the related experiences vicariously 
but often grasp their meaning as well. 
An evening spent watching a performance
of Othello has often proved the trigger for
a ‘eureka’ experience with regard to
jealousy.
This distinction between the two 
types of concept is not important for most
scientists as the objects of their study are
always physical and so they only need
Type 1 concepts. For psychologists,
however, it’s another story. Their prime
objects of study are the non-physical,
mental, aspects of human beings, but they
are not normally skilled in the use of
metaphor. As a consequence other less
satisfactory methods are used for
managing the narrative of Type 2
concepts. One way is to devise a Type 1
concept, covering a limited set of features
abstracted from the Type 2 concept you
wish to study, and with the same name.
This trick appears to render a Type 2
concept quantifiable and gives an illusion
of objectivity. Another is to conceive of
the mind as a binary state phenomenon –
disturbed or undisturbed – and use
presumed triggers or presumed
expressions to identify these states.
Richard McNally demonstrates very
effectively with the concept of trauma 
the kind of intellectual confusion that the
application of these methods produces. 
Euan Hill
Tunbridge Wells
Concepts of stress
The inclusion of a category of prolonged duress stress disorder
(PDSD) in DSM-5 (to be published in 2013) would relieve much
of the pressure to include a widening range of stressors under the
heading post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and avoid thereby
devaluing the construct, as Richard McNally has persuasively
argued would happen (‘Can we salvage the concept of
psychological trauma?’ May 2010). 
The clinical reality is that clients do present with the
symptom profile of PTSD but in response to lower-level chronic
stressors, such as bullying at work, or care of a loved one with a
progressive neurological disorder (Scott and Stradling (1994).
Further, the PDSD description (intrusive imagery, nightmares,
etc.) resonates more with these clients than alternative
descriptors legitimised by DSM-IV (e.g. anxiety disorder not
otherwise specified or depression). Treatment (Scott, 2008)
draws upon some of the strategies used in PTSD protocols, such
as writing about the chronic stressor. 
It is important that DSM-5 takes ‘milder’ disorders like PDSD
as seriously as the more severe, such as PTSD. I would suspect
that there is a different neurobiology between PTSD and PDSD,
but this remains to be elucidated. As Richard McNally suggests,
trauma is probably not a unitary phenomenon. The work of
Kelley et al. (2009) suggests that different trauma types lead to
unique variants of the PTSD syndrome.
Michael J. Scott
Liverpool
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I was most interested to 
see Christian Jarrett’s article
‘Helping the homeless’ in the
April issue. 
As a psychologist who,
after being in care with the
local authority, was homeless
for far too long, I am aware of
how quixotic fortune can be.
One can be homeless without
any educational qualification,
and in less than half a 
decade become a chartered
psychologist.
Even if we did not
personally experience
homelessness and its
consequent negative social
conditions, there are still
reasons why we as professional
psychologists, in a practical,
academic and humane
profession, should engage
deeply with such social issues.
The more revered academic
aspects of psychology 
in 2010 are
morphing into
practices that
see psychology
being put into
action and
research that
has an
application. As
Dr Jarrett
notes in his
article, the
American
Psychological
Association
recently presented a
presidential task force report
on ‘psychology’s contribution
to end homelessness’. I hope
that psychologists here in the
UK can be garnered into
something similar, and I shall
write to our President to see if
they will kindly lend the
weight of their office to
support this
venture.
Peter McParlin
Leeds
Response from
Society
President Sue
Gardner: Thank
you for your
suggestion. This
is clearly an
important area,
and one that I
think would benefit
from the Society’s input across
the Research Board and
Professional Practice Board.
Anyone keen to contribute
should e-mail
nigel.atter@bps.org.uk. The
two Boards may then consider
if this matter may be
prioritised within their
existing work or in the future.
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Shame on us
Reading Ray Crozier’s interesting piece (‘The puzzle of blushing’, May)
has reminded me of Mark Twain’s note, in Following the Equator: ‘Man
is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to.’ The final three words
surely suggest further avenues for Professor Crozier to explore.
John Edwards
St Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia
Diversity and clinical psychology
recruitment
I am a 37-year-old male, with a disability,
trying to meet the requirements for
assistant psychology posts. I strive to 
meet the evidential requirements for an
ultimate place on a clinical psychology
course. It does not matter that I have 
an immensely diverse background or 
a string of distinction-level qualifications.
I operate within a dual discourse that
complains about the homogeneity of the
current clinical psychology pool while
setting the specifications that maintain
this very homogeneity. 
I work in a forensic setting for
Sheffield Child and Young People Services,
travelling 90 miles to obtain my ‘relevant
experience’; I also have two young
children. Despite absence of the term
‘assistant psychologist’ from the clinical
clearing system specific criteria, it is clear
that up and down the country this is what
is expected now, in a very competitive
system. This is not simply an expression
of anecdote and angst but gleaned from
personal communication from a number
of clinicians who have been involved with
different recruitment processes for clinical
psychology for several universities. It is
not necessary to explicitly state ‘assistant
psychologist’ as a pre-requisite as it is
implicit by virtue of scalar-scoring
candidates on the quality of their relevant
experience through the presence or
absence of a clinical supervisor. For a role
to be advertised as ‘psychology assistant’ 
it must have a clinical supervisor under
BPS guidelines. These posts are also only
available to those with an intention to
pursue clinical training. 
The prevailing wisdom is that one
should be ‘willing to pursue such posts 
to hell and back’, and ‘be willing to travel
to do so’. This is problematic with two
young children who also need a father.
Already they lose me for days and nights
at a time as I try to gain my ‘relevant
experience’. If I want to pursue an
honorary psychology assistant role I 
must sacrifice ever more time from my
parenting role. So to achieve a fighting
chance, to gather the experience necessary
to follow a career, which is dedicated in 
a large proportion of its application to
resolving problems rooted in childhood
and upbringing, I must sacrifice the
parenting time of my own children. 
From discussions with seasoned
clinicians I am aware that the problem
does not stop there. A further impact 
of the application process is that many
women put off motherhood until they
have achieved and completed their clinical
training positions. As a consequence the
NHS loses a good percentage of successful
candidates, which it has just invested
three years’ worth of training upon, as
they can finally relax to pursue an
opportunity of motherhood.
The cry is for greater diversity within
clinical psychology; greater maturity of
candidates; more life experiences to enrich
the generally homogeneous classes of
clinical psychology students. I have heard
this cry before from my previous career in
South Yorkshire Police. The problem then
was structural and process-related,
indirectly discriminating against the very
qualities it sought to recruit. Can clinical
psychology not learn from this example 
to remove its own discriminating barriers
to diversity?
Andrew Williamson
Malton
North Yorkshire
Getting together on homelessness
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Christian Jarrett is staff journalist on The Psychologist. 
Share your views by e-mailing psychologist@bps.org.uk.
FORUM WEB CHAT
For anyone interested in the civil war occupying the counselling and
psychotherapy professions over their proposed statutory regulation by
the Health Professions Council (HPC), the Mental Health Nurse blog
provides some up-to-date, if somewhat biased and irreverent,
commentary. The blog’s pseudonymous authors, self-described as
‘mostly mental health nurses’, claimed early in May to have obtained
a leaked document ‘purporting to be the United Kingdom Council for
Psychotherapy’s (UKCP) critique of the proposal for psychotherapy to
become regulated by the HPC’. This 22-page document, available at
http://ht.ly/1Hdz4, argues that the problems with the HPC’s proposed
regulation ‘are so drastic that they do not admit of “fixes”.’ The
document has no named author although it states it was coordinated
by UKCP chair Professor Andrew Samuels. Writing for the blog,
‘Zarathustra’ describes the document as ‘sort of badly-argued tosh
that would make a humanities graduate weep’.
In earlier posts, writers on the blog have pointed to the case 
of arts therapist Derek Gale to show why the state regulation of
psychotherapy is so important. After being found guilty by the HPC of
inappropriate conduct, Gale was struck off the HPC register of Arts
Therapists and later the UKCP register. Yet, for some time at least, he
continued to advertise as a psychotherapist and counsellor, as he was
entitled to do in the absence of state regulation of these professions. 
Another document to appear on the web is a template letter
(http://ht.ly/1HdJI), for HPC opponents to send to their MPs, provided
by the Alliance of Counselling and Psychotherapy Against State
Regulation – an organisation, co-founded by Professor Samuels,
which claims to have gathered over 3000 signatories who oppose 
HPC regulation. The letter accuses the HPC of proceeding as if their
regulation of counselling and psychotherapy were a ‘foregone
conclusion’. It also includes four and a half pages of text detailing 
the problems with the HPC. An unnamed author highlights the
heterogeneity of the therapeutic professions – ‘several hundred
different schools and orientations’ – and the fact that the ‘notions’ 
by which the HPC benchmarks quality, including ‘health, well-being,
normality and dysfunction’, are rejected by many therapists.
The letter goes on to draw analogies between therapeutic work
and the unpredictable journey of Buddhist training in which the final
destination cannot be known. ‘This inherently risky work is clearly not
served by pretending that its results and procedures are clear,
predictable and transparent,’ the letter says. Curiously, the text of the
letter also appears on the PCA Yorks blog where it is described as a
‘great piece by that Darian Leader bloke’ (http://ht.ly/1HdTZ). Leader
is President of the College of Psychoanalysts UK and is involved in the
Alliance Against State Regulation. 
Meanwhile, over at the website of the UKCP, chief executive
Daniel Pink provided clarification of the organisation’s position in light
of ‘allegations that the regulation policies of UKCP have not been
properly developed or scrutinised before they have been published’
(http://bit.ly/ccrbMT). Pink writes: ‘UKCP is in favour of clear and
robust professional regulation. This has always been and continues to
be our position.’ He goes onto explain the organisation’s ‘multi-track’
approach including: negotiating ‘the best possible deal’ for
psychotherapists who wish to cooperate with the HPC, whilst also
ensuring that those who reject HPC regulation are ‘governed by
alternative professional regulation’. According to a news report 
that appeared on the Guardian website in May, ‘thousands of
psychotherapists’ are considering adopting new professional titles 
as a way to avoid registering with the HPC (http://ht.ly/1HE7i). 
Obedience in 
naturalistic settings
Jean-Léon Beavois’s replication
of Milgram’s obedience
experiment in a French TV
game show (‘Game of death’,
News, May 2010) was
intriguing, but it was not ‘the
first [replication] in a social
field where science was not
the source of legitimacy for the
agent of authority’. There have
been a few, starting with
Hofling et al.’s (1966)
‘experimental study in
nurse–physician relationships’. 
In Gamson et al.’s (1982)
diabolically cunning and
unjustly neglected field
experiment, the source of
legitimacy was a consultancy
firm. When volunteers
telephoned offering to
participate, they were asked
whether they would be 
willing to take part in 
(a) research on brand
recognition of commercial
products, (b) research on
product safety, (c) research 
in which you will be misled
about the purpose until
afterwards, and (d) research
involving group standards.
Most agreed to all four, but 
all were immediately told
(untruthfully) that they were
assigned to (d) and were asked
to go to a local Holiday Inn.
The deception had already
begun, and because they 
had agreed to (c), they had
arguably given informed
consent to be deceived!
In the testing sessions,
groups of nine participants
were asked by an employee 
of ‘Manufacturers Human
Relations Consultants’ to act
in a highly unethical and
damaging way towards an
innocent victim, the apparent
motive being to bolster the
legal case of a large oil
company against a garage
owner whom they had sacked
on patently unreasonable
grounds. Without going into
details, the results showed a
level of full compliance of 25
per cent, compared with
Milgram’s 65 per cent, but
various features of the
experiment that could account
for this difference. 
Andrew M. Colman
University of Leicester
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A sense of purpose
Jesse Bering (‘The nonexistent purpose of people’, April 2010)
argued cogently that a sense of purpose, destiny and meaning 
is an artefact of irrational pre-scientific human cognition, but
ended his article with examples only of the unhelpful
consequences of this (suicidal violence by religious extremists
and chronic self-doubts for young people). 
To redress the balance, it should be said that there is
considerable evidence from the research and therapy literature 
of the beneficial effect of having some sense of purpose and
meaning to one’s life and activities. This might take a spiritual,
social, communal or other form. Whether or not this is illusory
hardly matters. Furthermore, it is recognised that active
membership of a church community in this country has a
significant positive effect on health, psychological well-being 
and mortality.
Linda Shuttleworth
Chester
